Re: [marf] Reviewers for draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports

Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com> Fri, 20 April 2012 00:24 UTC

Return-Path: <steve@wordtothewise.com>
X-Original-To: marf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: marf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4522B11E80DC for <marf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:34 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.598
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8EIadSMXrl9F for <marf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from m.wordtothewise.com (misc.wordtothewise.com [184.105.179.154]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A75C111E8073 for <marf@ietf.org>; Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by m.wordtothewise.com (Postfix, from userid 1003) id 9A1EC2EB25; Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from platter.wordtothewise.com (204.11.227.194.static.etheric.net [204.11.227.194]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: steve) by m.wordtothewise.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D66662EAE2 for <marf@ietf.org>; Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:32 -0700 (PDT)
From: Steve Atkins <steve@wordtothewise.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1257)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_11E9D9F1-8B37-4784-BCA1-28E1833A92AA"
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:24:32 -0700
In-Reply-To: <9452079D1A51524AA5749AD23E0039280FB7E9@exch-mbx901.corp.cloudmark.com>
To: marf@ietf.org
References: <9452079D1A51524AA5749AD23E0039280FAF8D@exch-mbx901.corp.cloudmark.com> <938CD663-D2D5-4E65-B3D4-B02424DC7124@wordtothewise.com> <9452079D1A51524AA5749AD23E0039280FB6A1@exch-mbx901.corp.cloudmark.com> <12A039B2-3B42-49B1-887F-06A18B0C6ECA@wordtothewise.com> <9452079D1A51524AA5749AD23E0039280FB7E9@exch-mbx901.corp.cloudmark.com>
Message-Id: <7038EA71-76F7-470F-B7FD-2BD3F18B5F5B@wordtothewise.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1257)
Subject: Re: [marf] Reviewers for draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports
X-BeenThere: marf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Message Abuse Report Format working group discussion list <marf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/marf>, <mailto:marf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/marf>
List-Post: <mailto:marf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:marf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/marf>, <mailto:marf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2012 00:24:34 -0000

On Apr 19, 2012, at 5:08 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

>  
> 
> I'm not sure that [LOG] *as applied to email* has value in the real world. Sure, a mix of spam and legitimate mail might leak out from a NAT, but the fix for that is to not allow port 25 outbound from the NAT and route it to a smarthost (where it can be filtered, throttled and have correct Received headers to identify the user added) instead.
>  
> It's reasonably harmless to add this information to ARF reports, but to standardize it implies that allowing outbound port 25 from a carrier-grade NAT is acceptable practice, which goes against the "don't let end-users or dynamically assigned users send mail directly to receiver MXes" and "don't allow port 25 through a NAT" principles we've been pushing for a while.
>  
> [MSK: I don’t think publishing this extension amounts to an endorsement of allowing outbound port 25 from within a CGN.  Why is ARF the right place to make that stand?  For cases where such is allowed, the data exchange is desired.  Preventing ARF from doing it won’t change ISP policies.]

I think it's reasonably harmless to document how to do it in ARF. 

I don't think it will be of any value to report recipients or senders (for the reasons above) but that's no reason not to standardize it.

>  
>  
> What about ident?
>  
> [MSK: Does anyone still use that?]
>  
> Sure. I'm not suggesting people use it, but this proposal is a less reliable, less privacy-friendly, replacement for ident so I thought I'd at least mention it.
>  
> [MSK: I don’t think ident has enough current support to make it a viable alternative. 

I tend to agree - but this is such a direct replacement for ident I thought I'd mention it.

> How is adding ports to ARF reports a privacy concern?]

It's not. The privacy issue is in [LOG], not here.

Cheers,
  Steve