[martini] #46: Security Directorate review of draft-ietf-martini-reqs-07.txt
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Subject: [martini] #46: Security Directorate review of draft-ietf-martini-reqs-07.txt
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#46: Security Directorate review of draft-ietf-martini-reqs-07.txt -----------------------------------+---------------------------------------- Reporter: ho@… | Owner: john.elwell@… Type: defect | Status: new Priority: minor | Milestone: milestone1 Component: reqs | Version: 1.0 Severity: Submitted WG Document | Keywords: -----------------------------------+---------------------------------------- Do not be alarmed. I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The abstract: This document states requirements for a standardized SIP registration mechanism for multiple addresses of record, the mechanism being suitable for deployment by SIP service providers on a large scale in support of small to medium sized Private Branch Exchanges (PBXs). The requirements are for a solution that can, as a minimum, support AORs based on E.164 numbers. There are 21 requirements, and two of them address security. I think requirement 14 leaves out a couple of things: REQ14 - The mechanism MUST be able to operate over a transport that provides integrity protection and confidentiality. It should probably require "end-to-end" integrity protection and confidentiality between the two entities (SIP-PBX and the SSP). And I think requirement 15 should say something about how the two entites are expected to agree on an authentication method, and that the authentication should apply to every registration message exchanged by the entities. That is, once they have authenticated, then that information should be tied to requirement 14 and ensure that the integrity and/or confidentiality is defined between the two entities (by use of, for example, an authenticated key exchange protocol) on all subsequent messages between the two. REQ15 - The mechanism MUST support authentication of the SIP-PBX by the SSP and vice versa. I'd also add that it MUST support termination of authenticaton and re-authentication. Minor non-security things: Requirement 4 has a triple negative ("not" "prevent" "without"), and I'm not sure what the heck it means. Requirement 5 has a typo, probably "internally" for "internal". Hilarie -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/martini/trac/ticket/46> martini <http://tools.ietf.org/martini/>
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