Re: [MBONED] [Msr6] MSR6 BOF 3rd Issue Category: More details are requested about the large scale use cases, including issue 8-11

Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com> Wed, 02 November 2022 22:11 UTC

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From: Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2022 15:11:45 -0700
Cc: Jeffrey Zhang <zzhang@juniper.net>, "Xiejingrong (Jingrong)" <xiejingrong=40huawei.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, BIER WG <bier@ietf.org>, "msr6@ietf.org" <msr6@ietf.org>, "mboned@ietf.org" <mboned@ietf.org>, "pim@ietf.org" <pim@ietf.org>
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Subject: Re: [MBONED] [Msr6] MSR6 BOF 3rd Issue Category: More details are requested about the large scale use cases, including issue 8-11
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I'm not going to argue what has succeeded in the past or what has failed. They are subjective comments and are not productive for moving forward.

Removed text I'm not going to respond to.

My point was that its "easier to DoS attack a data-plane then a control-plane". I didn't make any other assertions about control-plane security.

> MSDP was then (predictably ?) the first protocol that brought down
> a good part of the Internet control plane when it was attacked UNINTENTIONAL:

This is simply not true. I was debugging such events at the time and the Internet was working or I wouldn't be able to debug it. ;-)

>> If not controlled, unlike SR, a general source-routing approach is loaded with security issues.
> 
> High level, you are arguing that control plane state is more trustworthy or
> better controlled than packet header state, but IP multicast control plane state

No I am not. Its easier to get access to the data-plane by an ordinary user. So anyone can really attack the data-plane, and they might not even know it. I did not mention trust at all.

Dino