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Re: [Medup] On Extra Keys in pEp

"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Thu, 30 March 2023 07:34 UTC

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Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2023 09:34:21 +0200
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: "\"Hernâni Marques (p≡p foundation)\"" <hernani.marques@pep.foundation>
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Subject: Re: [Medup] On Extra Keys in pEp
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Hi Hernani,

On Wed, 29 Mar 2023 06:05:11 +0200,
Hernâni Marques (p≡p foundation) wrote:
> You also find lines like that, reflecting what's written in 7.3; e.g.,  
> code line 3261 to 3263
> 
> [snip]
> 
>     // Ensure we don't encrypt to extra keys if this is a non-org account
>      if (!(target_id->flags & PEP_idf_org_ident))
>          extra = NULL;
> 
> [/snip]

Can you explain what a non-org account is, please.

> Any thoughts on that approach?

I see two aspects to this problem: when internal users (e.g.,
employees) send an encrypted message, and when external users send an
encrypted message (e.g., customers).

When an internal user sends a message, they can be trained to accept
the additional key.  That's easy.

But,when a customer sends an encrypted message to an employee, do they
automatically use the additional key?  If they have to opt in, how
does an organization decrypt messages for employees who are sick or on
vacation?

Thanks,

Neal

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