Re: [Mip6] Secure binding update..

Warodom Werapun wrote:
> 
>>
>> ABKs were considered as a potential mechanism to secure BUs to
>> correspondent nodes, among other techniques. The current RR
>> technique was the one chosen for the base spec, however.
>>
>> ABKs do not have anything to do with IPsec SAs.
> 
> 
> In ABKs draft said that  
> (http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/~silver/bibliography/mobileip)
>      RR has a weakness that if an attacker can eavesdrop on two links 
> (HA-CN and MN-CN), then it can send a fake BU successfully. CGA with an 
> initial round of RR is susceptible to this attack. The ABK protocol does 
> not have this weakness: an attacker who can eavesdrop on two links still 
> cannot send a MAC'd BU. However, if an attacker Okazaki, S. 
> Informational [Page 12]  Internet Draft Securing BUs July, 2002 can 
> alter messages on both the MN-CN and HA-CN links, then it is possible to 
> establish a fake BU with CN. As mentioned above, both RR and CGA (with 
> an initial round of RR) are susceptible to a similar attack.
> 
>    Why current RR technique was choosed?  How RR technique protected 
> this problem?

Some of the background has been discussed in
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nikander-mobileip-v6-ro-sec-02.txt

--Jari


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