[Mip6] [issue41] Ted Hardie's comment

New submission from Basavaraj Patil <basavaraj.patil@nokia.com>:

I think I'm confused. The document says in the Introduction:

  This mechanism is also limited to use only in
  scenarios where mobile nodes can be trusted to not misbehave, as the
  validity of the claimed care-of addresses is not verified.

In the applicability statement, it goes on to say:

  -  The correspondent node has good reason to trust the actions of
      the mobile node.  In particular, the correspondent node needs to
      be certain that the mobile node will not launch flooding attacks
      against a third party as described in [2].

But the Security Considerations don't contain any details about what happens
if this trust is misplaced.  draft-ietf-mip6-ro-sec-03 has quite a taxonomy
of potential issues; I would have thought that a basic run-through of those
would be useful.  Not that it needs to go through the whole document, but
a statement about whether any existing consideration (one of the flooding
attacks?)  are worsened by this approach or that none are would seem
like a valuable addition.

----------
category: Editorial
draft: draft-ietf-mip6-precfgkbm
messages: 141
nosy: bpatil
priority: Should fix
status: Pending
title: Ted Hardie's comment

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