[Mipshop] What happens if an AR is compromised? (Re: How probable is compromise of an AR?)

Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com> Tue, 22 August 2006 09:09 UTC

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Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 17:09:44 +0800
To: Wassim Haddad <whaddad@tcs.hut.fi>
From: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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Subject: [Mipshop] What happens if an AR is compromised? (Re: How probable is compromise of an AR?)
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Wassim,

I think using an AR for HMIP key management increases the impact of 
compromise of the AR (I have explained how in my previous 
emails).  You seem to think otherwise.  So, I have a request for you:

Please provide a comparative threat analysis assuming an AR is 
vulnerable to compromise between the following two cases:
  1) assume IKE (4140's suggestion) as the key management protocol for HMIP.
  2) assume the protocol in draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-06 
as the solution.

Perhaps you might also add Vidya's suggestion of CGA-authenticated 
IKE as the solution into the mix and perform the analysis.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

thanks,
Lakshminath

At 04:49 PM 8/22/2006, Wassim Haddad wrote:
>On Mon, 21 Aug 2006, James Kempf wrote:
>
> > Right. Securing the paths won't reduce threat of node compromise, however.
>
>=> I don't think anyone disagree with this.
>
> > That's where physical security comes in,
>
>=> And its existence cannot be ignored especially that the amount of
>damage caused by an AR compromise is by far larger than the scope of
>HMIPsec.
>
>
>Wassim H.


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