[Mipshop] Revised I-D: draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-02.txt
Christian Vogt <chvogt@tm.uka.de> Tue, 12 December 2006 19:09 UTC
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GuD0V-00066y-FN; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 14:09:39 -0500
Received: from [10.91.34.44] (helo=ietf-mx.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GuD0U-00066q-EW for mipshop@ietf.org; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 14:09:38 -0500
Received: from iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de ([141.3.10.81]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GuD0S-00080Y-UZ for mipshop@ietf.org; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 14:09:38 -0500
Received: from irams1.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de ([141.3.10.5]) by iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de with esmtps id 1GuD0M-0000Hd-Cl; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 20:09:36 +0100
Received: from i72ms2.tm.uni-karlsruhe.de ([141.3.70.17] helo=smtp.ipv6.tm.uni-karlsruhe.de) by irams1.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de with esmtps id 1GuD0L-00041Y-L7; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 20:09:29 +0100
Received: from [IPv6:2001:638:204:6:20c:6eff:fe40:8d95] (archimedes.ipv6.tm.uni-karlsruhe.de [IPv6:2001:638:204:6:20c:6eff:fe40:8d95]) by smtp.ipv6.tm.uni-karlsruhe.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B9B9B5BC; Tue, 12 Dec 2006 20:09:29 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <457EFE68.90209@tm.uka.de>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2006 20:09:28 +0100
From: Christian Vogt <chvogt@tm.uka.de>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; de; rv:1.8.0.8) Gecko/20060911 SUSE/1.5.0.8-0.1 Thunderbird/1.5.0.8 Mnenhy/0.7.4.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Mipshop <mipshop@ietf.org>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.94.1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Spam-Score: -4.2 (----)
X-Spam-Status: No
X-Spam-Report: -1.8 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP -2.6 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] 0.2 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: 769a46790fb42fbb0b0cc700c82f7081
Cc: Wassim Haddad <whaddad@tcs.hut.fi>, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, Vijay Devarapalli <vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com>
Subject: [Mipshop] Revised I-D: draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-02.txt
X-BeenThere: mipshop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: mipshop.ietf.org
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Post: <mailto:mipshop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop>, <mailto:mipshop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: mipshop-bounces@ietf.org
Hello folks, we submitted a new version of draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba, which is available at the following URL: http://doc.tm.uka.de/2006/draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-02.txt The document includes a list of changes that we applied during the revision in the Change Log section starting on page 55. You may also want to take a look at the diff's between the previous document version and this new one, which you find here: http://doc.tm.uka.de/2006/draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-01to02.html The new document version addresses the comments from James Kempf and Zhen Cao. James suggested to include time-sequence diagrams to make the Protocol Operation section more easily understandable. Those have been included. Zhen Cao addressed the issue with increasing the minimum length for CGA keys beyond the 384-bit limit prescribed RFC 3972. While we found during the discussion that a higher minimum key length is not necessary, we agreed to document this decision in the Security Considerations section. This security considerations also elaborate on upcoming changes to RFC 3972 [draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01] and how those might affect the CGA application in draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba. An earlier mailing list discussion, which Manhee Jo had initiated, tackled the well-known vulnerability to spoofed Binding Acknowledgment messages from on-path attackers. Such attackers could trick a mobile node into accepting a bogus permanent home keygen tokens, thereby rendering the mobile node unable to pursue further binding updates with a correspondent node. This vulnerability can only be fixed through strong correspondent node authentication, e.g., by leveraging the correspondent node's CGA public key. We initially did not fix this vulnerability because it exists already in the non-mobile Internet. OTOH, there also were no objections against adding stronger correspondent node authentication during the presentation in Montreal, so we finally decided to add support for optional CGA-based correspondent node authentication. See sections 4.3, 4.4, and 6.7. All the best, - Christian -- Christian Vogt, Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH) www.tm.uka.de/~chvogt/pubkey/ _______________________________________________ Mipshop mailing list Mipshop@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop
- [Mipshop] Revised I-D: draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba… Christian Vogt