Re: [Model-t] ICN as an example (was: Re: (meta) Trust, and threat vs vulnerability models)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 14 February 2020 20:23 UTC

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Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 12:23:13 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Robin Wilton <wilton@isoc.org>, "model-t@iab.org" <model-t@iab.org>
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Subject: Re: [Model-t] ICN as an example (was: Re: (meta) Trust, and threat vs vulnerability models)
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On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 08:18:28PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> Hi Robin,
> 
> I'm not sure I'm following your argument TBH, but that
> might be because I think the answer to:
> 
> On 14/02/2020 17:52, Robin Wilton wrote:
> > "does a shift towards information-centric networking change the
> > reasons why I should or should not trust the network to behave as I
> > expect?"
> 
> ...is fairly straightforwardly a "no."
> 
> Without straying too far into ICN weeds (but I am a bit,
> hence the change to the subject line:-), ICN has no real
> conception of confidentiality nor access control that
> doesn't bring it right back to host-based networking (in
> terms of risks). I guess in future someone might figure
> out "pure" ICN-oriented solutions for such services, but
> afaik, they've not. I think the same is also still true
> for how any PKI might be used to support ICN, so even
> the signed-data doesn't really change many of the risks
> that much.
> 
> So I'm not clear that consideration of ICN will be that
> enlightening for us.

I'm not super-versed in ICN, but it seems like it would be more of an
object security model than a connection-oriented one, so it might become
hard to know that you have received the latest information of a given kind.

-Ben