Re: [mpls] MPLS-RT review on draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-04.txt

Mach Chen <mach.chen@huawei.com> Mon, 18 May 2015 09:49 UTC

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From: Mach Chen <mach.chen@huawei.com>
To: "adrian@olddog.co.uk" <adrian@olddog.co.uk>, "draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt@tools.ietf.org" <draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt@tools.ietf.org>, "mpls-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <mpls-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [mpls] MPLS-RT review on draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-04.txt
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Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 09:49:19 +0000
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Subject: Re: [mpls] MPLS-RT review on draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-04.txt
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Hi Adrian,

> > > More likely to be an issue is how to handle OAM on the LSP that has
> > > end-to-end encryption but where the OAM is targeted at a transit
> > > node. That is the issue that needs further exploration.
> >
> > Yes, traceroute is such a typical scenario. For end-to-end encryption,
> > the
> transit
> > nodes should not (and for OS purpose, it MUST not) know how to decrypt
> > the packets, then traceroute will fail.
> 
> Yup.
> The thing I'd like to look at is whether it would be OK to run the OAM
> (specifically intermediate-node action OAM) without encryption. 

Seems that this is the only feasible way to go. 

>But I think there are some issues with ECMP.

Indeed, you have to introduce EL then.

> 


Best regards,
Mach