[mpls] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-node-protection-05: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

["Stephen Farrell" <[e-mail]>]

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-node-protection-05: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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The MUST in para 2 section 3 seems to me to create a possibly
new DoS enabler. The ability of N to cause this kind of ripple
effect, (setting up then pushing traffic to a bunch of new
LSPs), is what may be new. Exactly where in the referenced RFCs
is that covered? Or am I wrong that this is a new threat? (BTW:
Answering that this new threat is no worse than other existing
threats if one has access to the internals of a node.... is a
non-answer:-)


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COMMENT:
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While it is fine to re-use text, it is increasingly hard to
believe that almost nothing done since RFC5920 (dated in 2010)
has any new security considerations.  Put another way, who is
really helped by a 2 line security considerations section that
points at 6388 which points at 5036 (etc)?