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[Mud] administrative control of devices --- thinking again about an IoT security WG

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 18 September 2020 21:57 UTC

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Subject: [Mud] administrative control of devices --- thinking again about an IoT security WG
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Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
    > This includes:
    > * administrative control of devices

Some have asked how big this effort would be.
I think that it might rather small, and it does not have to a single solution
either.  90% of the challenge in building administrative interfaces is the
authorization side.  This is something that can be handled during onboarding.

A RESTCONF interface might be enough.
  1) https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-keystore/ provides
     a way to update a WPA-PSK key for network access.

  2) https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8341/ and/or
     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors/
     provides a way to update who can manage the device.  

  3) I looked for a way to statically configure DNS server IPs into a device,
     should one not be willing to use the Do53 ones from DHCP.  There isn't
     such a thing, but I'll bet ADD WG would comment on such a document.
     I was actually looking for some network configuration ("MIB") YANG module, which
     I'm sure exists, but I'm not YANG expert.
     
  4) https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwatsen-netconf-sztp-csr/
     can be used to renew management interface certificates.  Or the
     onboarding system might have an LDevID renewal process.

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [ 
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [

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