In-Band Rollover and Out-Of-Band Priming

"Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net> Tue, 13 July 2004 12:16 UTC

From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@ripe.net>
Subject: In-Band Rollover and Out-Of-Band Priming
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2004 14:16:39 +0200
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This is a heads up for: draft-kolkman-dnsext-dnssec-in-band-rollover-00:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kolkman-dnsext-dnssec-in-band-rollover-00.txt

Abstract

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) works by validating so called
   chains of authority.  The start of these chains of authority are
   usually public keys that are anchored in the DNS clients, the so
   called trust anchors.

   This memo describes a method how these client trust anchors can be
   replaced using the DNS validation and querying mechanisms (in-band)
   if the key pairs used for signing by zone owner are rolled.

   This memo also describes a method to establish the validity of trust
   anchors for initial configuration, or priming, using out of band
   mechanisms.


This will be on the agenda of Thuesday slot. 



-- Olaf
   Co-author


---------------------------------| Olaf M. Kolkman
---------------------------------| RIPE NCC


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