Re: [dnsext] Section 5.1 of draft-dnssec-bis

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Tue, 08 June 2010 14:36 UTC

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To: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <a06240800c833dc0dbc79@[192.168.1.104]>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Section 5.1 of draft-dnssec-bis
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 08 Jun 2010 07:48:57 -0400." <a06240800c833dc0dbc79@[192.168.1.104]>
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In message <a06240800c833dc0dbc79@[192.168.1.104]>, Edward Lewis writes:
> Why does section 5.1 exist?  It's going to create problems once 
> resolvers start validating responses.

Because RFC 4034 go the list wrong.  RFC 3755, which introduced NSEC
had it right.  RFC 4034 broke compatibility.  Section 5.1 restores
compatibility.

RFC 3755

   The new types will have exactly the same syntax and semantics as
   specified for SIG, KEY, and NXT in RFC 2535 and RFC 3658 except for
   the following:

   1) Consistent with [RFC3597], domain names embedded in RRSIG and NSEC
      RRs MUST NOT be compressed,

   2) Embedded domain names in RRSIG and NSEC RRs are not downcased for
      purposes of DNSSEC canonical form and ordering nor for equality
      comparison, and

   3) An RRSIG with a type-covered field of zero has undefined
      semantics.  The meaning of such a resource record may only be
      defined by IETF Standards Action.

> Section 5.1 says:
> 
> 5.  Interoperability Concerns
> 
> 5.1.  Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List
> 
>     When canonicalizing DNS names, DNS names in the RDATA section of NSEC
>     and RRSIG resource records are not downcased.
> 
>     [RFC4034] Section 6.2 item 3 has a list of resource record types for
>     which DNS names in the RDATA are downcased for purposes of DNSSEC
>     canonical form (for both ordering and signing).  That list
>     erroneously contains NSEC and RRSIG.  According to [RFC3755], DNS
>     names in the RDATA of NSEC and RRSIG should not be downcased.
> 
>     The same section also erroneously lists HINFO, and twice at that.
>     Since HINFO records contain no domain names, they are not subject to
>     downcasing.
> 
> The document-trouble here is that RFC 4034 (et.al.) obsoletes RFC 
> 3755.  This draft now says that the obsoleting document (4034) is to 
> be updated by the obsoleted document (3755).

No.  It says that RFC 4034 has a error in it.  That the earlier list
was correct and that this document is correcting the list to match
that in RFC 3755.

> The reality-problem here is that RFC 4034's section 6.2 makes sense. 
> RFC 3755 did not on this matter.  When it comes to the DNSSEC types, 
> DNSSEC can make type-specific rules about the RDATA.

Not in the context of why one canonicalize domain names.  The only
reason to do this is because the name could be compressed.  NSEC
and RRSIG records have never been allowed to be compressed.
 
> The operations&tools-problem here is that there are tools being 
> produced that automatically manage the NSEC (and NSEC3) chains.  Some 
> tools are exhibiting unexpected behavior in operations because they 
> follow the un-vetted draft and not the existing proposed standard.

No.  There is a problem because we missed the fact that the list
was wrong and in the process broke compatibility with existing code
for no good reason.

The draft is there to catch the errata in the DNSSEC documents and
that includes RFC 4034.  Perhaps it is time to publish the draft.

Mark

> -- 
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> Edward Lewis             
> NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468
> 
> Discussing IPv4 address policy is like deciding what to eat on the Titanic.
> --============_-936124530==_ma============
> Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
> 
> <!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
> <html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
> blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
>  --></style><title>Section 5.1 of
> draft-dnssec-bis</title></head><body>
> <div>Why does section 5.1 exist?&nbsp; It's going to create problems
> once resolvers start validating responses.</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>Section 5.1 says:</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>5.&nbsp; Interoperability Concerns<br>
> <br>
> 5.1.&nbsp; Errors in Canonical Form Type Code List<br>
> <br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; When canonicalizing DNS names, DNS names in the RDATA
> section of NSEC<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; and RRSIG resource records are not downcased.<br>
> <br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC4034] Section 6.2 item 3 has a list of resource
> record types for<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; which DNS names in the RDATA are downcased for purposes
> of DNSSEC<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; canonical form (for both ordering and signing).&nbsp;
> That list<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; erroneously contains NSEC and RRSIG.&nbsp; According to
> [RFC3755], DNS<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; names in the RDATA of NSEC and RRSIG should not be
> downcased.<br>
> <br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; The same section also erroneously lists HINFO, and twice
> at that.<br>
> &nbsp;&nbsp; Since HINFO records contain no domain names, they are not
> subject to</div>
> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp; downcasing.</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>The document-trouble here is that RFC 4034 (et.al.) obsoletes RFC
> 3755.&nbsp; This draft now says that the obsoleting document (4034) is
> to be updated by the obsoleted document (3755).</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>The reality-problem here is that RFC 4034's section 6.2 makes
> sense.&nbsp; RFC 3755 did not on this matter.&nbsp; When it comes to
> the DNSSEC types, DNSSEC can make type-specific rules about the
> RDATA.</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>The operations&amp;tools-problem here is that there are tools
> being produced that automatically manage the NSEC (and NSEC3) chains.&nbsp;
> Some tools are exhibiting unexpected behavior in operations because
> they follow the un-vetted draft and not the existing proposed
> standard.</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <x-sigsep><pre>-- 
> </pre></x-sigsep>
> <div
> >-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=<span
> ></span>-=-=-=-</div>
> <div>Edward
> Lewis&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
> ></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>
> NeuStar&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
> ></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; You can
> leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468</div>
> <div><br></div>
> <div>Discussing IPv4 address policy is like deciding what to eat on
> the Titanic.</div>
> </body>
> </html>
> --============_-936124530==_ma============--
> 
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org