Re: [dnsext] about ECDSA

 In your previous mail you wrote:

>  On 04/06/2012 08:23 PM, Francis Dupont wrote:
>  >>> - I still have a question about the 256/384 pair: are they 
>  >>> supposed to be handled as two different algos (as RSASHA1 and 
>  >>> RSASHA256, or RSASHA256 and RSASHA512) or as the same algo with
>  >>> two different "strengths"? Note at the beginning (i.e., when I
>  >>> asked this many months ago) it was only a concern for the
>  >>> signer but according to a recent discussion it is concern for
>  >>> resolvers too.
>  
>  The first not the latter, like RSASHA1 and RSASHA256, they are
>  different algorithms.  Use the same algorithm for your ZSK and KSK
>  (but apply different policy).

=> note my question is really about the application of the word
"same" to ECDSAP256SHA256 / ECDSAP384SHA384 (a priori if they
have different code points and names they are not the "same",
now RSA has a degree of freedom which is not present in ECDSA).

>  >> They are different algorithms with different strengths, so your 
>  >> either/or question doesn't make sense. Similarly, each of the
>  >> defined SHA-2 variants are also different algorithms and each has
>  >> a different strength.
>  > 
>  > => I'll rephrase the question: does it make sense to use 
>  > ECDSAP256SHA256 for ZSKs and ECDSAP384SHA384 for the KSK?
>  
>  No, that is dnssec-bogus.  The ECDSAP384SHA384 for KSK but does not
>  sign the zone is a signing-error.  You must sign the entire zone with
>  that algorithm, if you use it.  The algorithm-support is signalled
>  per-algorithm in DS and DNSKEY records, not for a range or suite of
>  algorithms.

=> I agree but I want to be sure it is the intented thing.
If there is no opposed opinion in the list I follow you.

Thanks

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr
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