Re: [MEXT] MIP threats (Re: re-direction attack on MCoA)

marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es> Mon, 11 February 2008 09:53 UTC

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From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
To: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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Cc: Julien Laganier <julien.laganier@laposte.net>, mext@ietf.org, Christian Vogt <christian.vogt@ericsson.com>, Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: [MEXT] MIP threats (Re: re-direction attack on MCoA)
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Hi Lakshminath,

I haven't review the document, but the document that i understand  
George, Wassim and Ben are thinking about is an analysis of residual  
threats in rfc3775 (or more in general in MIPv6). I mean, assuming all  
the security measures currently available, what threats are still  
there and whether we need to address them. One clear case if the case  
of flooding attack towards a given using the HA, as Ben and other  
folks have noticed

Regards, marcelo


El 07/02/2008, a las 23:27, Lakshminath Dondeti escribió:

> Hi Suresh, George, all,
>
> Please see
> draft-vidya-ip-mobility-threats-01
> draft-vidya-ip-mobility-sec-reqs-01
>
> Christian, Charles, Vidya and I have been working on the same topic  
> and
> wrote those documents (we hope to prepare an update before the next
> meeting).  Perhaps these could be a starting point?
>
> regards,
> Lakshminath
>
> On 1/31/2008 3:08 AM, George Tsirtsis wrote:
>> I am of course also interested in this work. I guess we already have
>> enough people to get the ball rolling on this.
>>
>> Thanks
>> George
>>
>> On Jan 31, 2008 10:59 AM, Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com 
>> > wrote:
>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>  I am willing to work on a generic MIPv6 threats document along  
>>> with the other interested people.
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>> Suresh
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: marcelo bagnulo braun [mailto:marcelo@it.uc3m.es]
>>> Sent: January 31, 2008 11:13 AM
>>> To: Wassim Haddad
>>> Cc: Julien Laganier; mext@ietf.org
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: [MEXT] re-direction attack on MCoA
>>>
>>>
>>> El 30/01/2008, a las 19:16, Wassim Haddad escribió:
>>>> => As there is a clear interest in the redirection attack on the HA
>>>> side, I volunteer to do some work on this one.
>>>>
>>> I think the work should be general to all residual threats on MIP as
>>> George mentioned, i think this would be more interesting since it
>>> would allow us to put the different threats in perspective and  
>>> figure
>>> out which ones we should address.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Wassim H.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> El 30/01/2008, a las 18:19, Wassim Haddad escribió:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Marcelo,
>>>>>> IMHO, this topic has to be included as a new item in the new
>>>>>> charter and
>>>>>> should not be limited to MCoA.
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Wassim H.
>>>>>> On Wed, 30 Jan 2008, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>>>>>>> Pascal,
>>>>>>> The question at this point is the following one: do you think
>>>>>>> that this threat should be addressed in the MCoA draft itself?
>>>>>>> comments?
>>>>>>> Regards, marcelo
>>>>>>> El 30/01/2008, a las 10:09, Pascal Thubert (pthubert) escribió:
>>>>>>>> I agree with Wassim on both mails.
>>>>>>>> There's also the situation where the MN/MR might be fooled by  
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> visited network into believing that the CoA (or its prefix if a
>>>>>>>> network
>>>>>>>> is attacked as opposed to a host) is on the visited link. DSMIP
>>>>>>>> is also
>>>>>>>> exposed, in particular with IPv4 CoAs.
>>>>>>>> There are many scenarios that do not involve high mobility were
>>>>>>>> a 3-way
>>>>>>>> or a 4-way handshake could be used to verify the CoA. We have
>>>>>>>> proposed
>>>>>>>> such a test in section 6 of the RRH draft that uses a triggered
>>>>>>>> 2nd BU
>>>>>>>> flow to verify the CoA in the first one:
>>>>>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thubert-nemo-reverse-routing-header-07#
>>>>>>>> section-6
>>>>>>>> Pascal
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: Wassim Haddad [mailto:whaddad@tcs.hut.fi]
>>>>>>>>> Sent: mercredi 30 janvier 2008 09:32
>>>>>>>>> To: Benjamin Lim
>>>>>>>>> Cc: 'Julien Laganier'; mext@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [MEXT] re-direction attack on MCoA
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 30 Jan 2008, Benjamin Lim wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> All in all, what I am trying to say is that tracing only
>>>>>>>>>> limits the
>>>>>>>>>> effect of the attack from escalating further and not
>>>>>>>>>> preventing it.
>>>>>>>>> => which (again) also perfectly applies to a single CoA.
>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>> Wassim H.
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> MEXT mailing list
>>>>>>>>> MEXT@ietf.org
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