Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments
Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com> Thu, 14 November 2019 13:48 UTC
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Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 14:47:38 +0100
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From: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments
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Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote: > > Hi Martin, > > > >> The issue presents itself when configuring the "server-identity" in > >> ietf-ssh-server, whether a local definition or a reference to a key in > >> the keystore. A "must" expression could be used to constrain the > >> supported key-formats allowed. Our modules could hardcode this for > >> all implementations > > > > Ok. This is worth exploring imo. > > I added FIXME comments into all of ietf-[ssh/tls]-[client/server]. > > > > >>> You're using a normal config false list for this (which is fine), but > >>> I don't think you can use a single global list like this. > >> > >> I don't understand this statement. > > > > My point is really just that a single global list like this is not > > sufficient. It doesn't matter if "feature" has problems; a single > > global config false list is not sufficient for what you're trying to > > do. > > True. But how can we define a way to get a list per instance? Should > there be a "config false" list wherever the "algorithm" node appears > (i.e., put the list into the crypto-type groupings having the > algorithm node?) I don't know, probably. Do we really want that? Probably not. This is exaclty why I suggested earlier that we don't spend time trying to solve this problem at all now. I'd rather not put in something that we know doesn't really work. > >> Not true or, rather, the intention is to support native encoding > >> formats, including DER vs PEM, and CMS vs multi-part PEM. > > > > But that would be different key-format identities, right? > > I think so, yes. > > > The issue > > here is about what the specfic format is for ssh-public-key-format. > > The format I suggest is also already used in RFC 7317, as was pointed > > out before by someone else. > > That is the binary encoding for the on-the-wire public key. Yes, for > the binary encoding, this is a great option. But I thought a goal was > to try to use native tool formats when possible. Not that we want to > hardcode to OpenSSH, but `man ssh-keygen`: > > -m key_format > Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export) > conversion options. The supported key formats are: > ``RFC4716'' (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), > ``PKCS8'' (PEM PKCS8 public key) or ``PEM'' (PEM > public key). The default conversion format is > ``RFC4716''. Setting a format of ``PEM'' when > generating or updating a supported private key > type will cause the key to be stored in the legacy > PEM private key format. > > > >>>> That said, if you refer to the link I provided at top, it is my belief > >>>> that the "key-format" node may be extended to support alternate > >>>> encodings (e.g., DER vs PEM and, potentially, CMS vs multi-part PEM). > >>>> To this end, perhaps we could support both the 4716 and 4253 formats. > >>> > >>> Do we really want to go there? This is already quite complex, and > >>> having a multitude of optional formats for the same thing may make > >>> things even more complex, to understand and get right. > >> > >> Binary formats (e.g., DER) are fundamental, but some raised usability > >> concerns > > > > Do you have a pointer to this? > > There was an email from Juergen a few months back. But that was based on a misunderstanding. (or you mean something else) > >> , hence the exploration. As for complexity, how do we know > >> until we try? > > > > I think we _are_ trying now... > > Fair, but there's yet to be a concrete proposal for how to support, > e.g., multi-part PEM encoding and, in particular, how it is > distinguished from the PEM encoding of the equivalent CMS. Presumably > it's just another identity, but there maybe more to it... > > > Kent // contributor > /martin
- [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund