Re: [nfsv4] NFS over TLS for laptops

David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com> Sat, 02 January 2021 10:57 UTC

Return-Path: <davenoveck@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: nfsv4@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: nfsv4@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B7A63A107C for <nfsv4@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 02:57:18 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.097
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.097 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cujMYoKDMyIj for <nfsv4@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 02:57:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-qt1-x830.google.com (mail-qt1-x830.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::830]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BCA63A1076 for <nfsv4@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 02:57:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-qt1-x830.google.com with SMTP id g24so15386814qtq.12 for <nfsv4@ietf.org>; Sat, 02 Jan 2021 02:57:16 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=Dr7RAN3dUXBsBZj45w7eHZBWe6bnRx7IcKSctyCWEUQ=; b=VuAr33q3PJ1Ih3taed6b+G8a46xM5bT1zA2hC/cBzQJDTENUwuvnJ8a8WFzRkKAeso f56j7qsVrVW3JNXeRiBdq5jiPqevddDMEZdLWyHG0w5IV0634dA998LO4W9VLYEnYXaf P65vdjd/TMsHXSz0SajZPYyXenp43U488yBmUvy3aUmaO+/2q2RfWBE2d+yvrzGW3THb qcWYHwHLiSRh4T5rjJ7C2PiUUY10iFzSEBqUw9wdsxCwiu0xXQ/0I0MY0h9OphlgWEM0 fDLNUidhPwEA7qC0sWI3Y3kZ47LAHd/v1dzPRX6xQDWFi3B8Su3TY+/hrk1SfDyeEU0x J/eQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=Dr7RAN3dUXBsBZj45w7eHZBWe6bnRx7IcKSctyCWEUQ=; b=NY63mYxWDDbu7SGQ0+MZazpflYRo9fxFWahzHu9PKQp+Um+XU3Q/8Ii8RVJsoHc05J XTkm9pSb8p/oZMi9uqpuh6E5mwR7yYXDhNhADApU60jLcltrwfrIb1aSi5IOBqo7tFFm pjBdNL2cixvdAlutLx4yptnnZp02OyY/PzP2XmJuUP1+psfrHXEwVCNltKfV40dqt2Xj nMANJUeNK1FCdMLUl2mTEnJiGYKEfTF0bPSiCQaDXkt9HD92uIqltGCCZbV47ueL3ZEB QNQlLvpfw0U6Q60GjpCCUmpkbniRF2QnVgf6Tb6xFn8eWowqh0sTKImrcgxDg3UtU6lQ frxA==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533u0YaS7NfMtE6AITMX+6QuJE04c+2EeazRliiW8Ajdr9TfrvRN az7KySOIQnFQP8Lys5O5+JNEB/Uo0rOqqGVDIQY=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzWxCC3LOmkEk/5sFR72XtNcdcmNz77t7TEocJVHTmji6STPmNNSrgHZaf44+U79qVmcdmppGwIHemRhh1BjqA=
X-Received: by 2002:aed:3b13:: with SMTP id p19mr64476737qte.302.1609585035489; Sat, 02 Jan 2021 02:57:15 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <YQXPR0101MB09680BC1A27265F81C5B5671DDC40@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <DEBCFB38-9A1A-43BB-A8DF-0C64792AF30F@oracle.com> <YQXPR0101MB09689564C0543291E25FB274DDC20@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <YQXPR0101MB09687759005C97725CFC1AFCDDC10@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <13B0E10F-0E40-47AC-A6E3-495DF578DCAB@oracle.com> <YQXPR0101MB0968D1AB5DC7A55DE4E5F404DDDE0@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <1113F47A-BDA1-4C34-95B4-1EB8076BA071@oracle.com> <20201229190707.GB89068@kduck.mit.edu> <0D8595B7-4636-4E6A-A5C1-E0FE85D820D0@oracle.com> <YQXPR0101MB096833395FEE6E63590BE7B5DDD60@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <20210101055832.GK93151@kduck.mit.edu> <YQXPR0101MB09684118744ED0EA876DCE02DDD40@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
In-Reply-To: <YQXPR0101MB09684118744ED0EA876DCE02DDD40@YQXPR0101MB0968.CANPRD01.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
From: David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2021 05:57:03 -0500
Message-ID: <CADaq8jfxsLcTHQrtSF3GZ04+tmcjPg_KK5kHFaD1N9T00pH6sg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000046b6ff05b7e8b8e5"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nfsv4/L6X77_EcCEekDu73RRBKly95qBU>
Subject: Re: [nfsv4] NFS over TLS for laptops
X-BeenThere: nfsv4@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: NFSv4 Working Group <nfsv4.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/nfsv4>, <mailto:nfsv4-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nfsv4/>
List-Post: <mailto:nfsv4@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:nfsv4-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4>, <mailto:nfsv4-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2021 10:57:19 -0000

On Fri, Jan 1, 2021, 7:28 PM Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca> wrote:

> >From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> >On Thu, Dec 31, 2020 at 04:53:04PM +0000, Rick Macklem wrote:
> >> Chuck Lever wrote:
> >> > Ben Kaduk wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> I suspect that we can find a compromise position, yes.
> >> >> The certificate still authenticates the client (not the user), and
> the
> >> >> client uses AUTH_SYS to claim what user is performing operations.
> But the
> >> >> server uses the client's authenticated identity to restrict, by
> policy,
> >> >> what user identities the client is allowed to claim via AUTH_SYS.
> In the
> >> >> degenerate case there is an otherName in the certificate that
> corresponds
> >> >> to a single user and the client can only claim that one user, which
> looks
> >> >> very similar to just authenticating the user, but we can say that the
> >> >> relevant policy logic is located in the server as part of its
> internal
> >> >> implementation choices.
> >> >
> >> >An NFS client might send legitimate operations as UID 0 too
> >> >(e.g., lease management). Those cannot be rejected. Perhaps
> >> >we need to specify that the client has to perform _all_
> >> >operations as the squashed user.
> >> Yes. I agree with this.
> >> My current implementation simply ignores the AUTH_SYS RPC
> >> credential when TLS squashing is enabled.
> >
> >Hmm, that may not be as robust as you want, since a certificate is allowed
> >to have more than one SAN of any given type.  I think that if we do write
> >up something like this we should be sure to define behavior when multiple
> >names are present in the certificate.
> Good point. I assumed there would only be one "user@domain" entry.
> I can see a couple of alternatives for this:
> 1 - Only allow one and reply AUTH_ERR if there is more than one.
> 2 - Allow more than one, but require that they all have different
>   "domain" fields. The server would use the one for the "domain"
>   that the server supports. The NFS server would reply AUTH_ERR
>   if none of the domain names match one the server supports.
>   If the server supports more than one of the domains in the set
>   of names, it could be required that the server reply AUTH_ERR
>   or leave it up to the server implementor?
>   This would allow the certificate to work for multiple NFS servers
>   with different username domains.
> Personally, I prefer #2.
>
> As an aside, I think that an NFSv4 server can support multiple
> username domains.


It's certainly allowed by the spec.  If it were not, there would be no
point in including "@domain" in each user and group name.

Howeverrr I am not aware of any NFSv4 server
> implementations that handle more than one username domain
> in Owner and Owner_Group names at this time.
>

This topic is discussed in some detail in RFC 8000. The motivation was
FedFs deployments.

Are there any?
>

I don't know of any.


> rick
>
> -Ben
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> nfsv4 mailing list
> nfsv4@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4
>