Re: [nfsv4] Sending a stronger message in rpc-tls

[Chuck Lever <[e-mail]>]

> On Apr 4, 2020, at 9:40 AM, David Noveck <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> One possibility to consider is replacing the penultimate paragraph of the Introduction by the following two paragraphs.
> 
> The current document assumes policies in line with [RFC7435]
> in order to enable RPC-on-TLS to be deployed opportunistically in
> environments that contain RPC implementations that do not support 
> TLS.  Specifications for RPC-based upper-layer protocols will often
> choose to require stricter policies in order to guarantee that encryption 
> or host authentication is in use on every connection.   
> 
> Imposition of such stricter policies is of particular importance with regard to 
> protocols for which the within-protocol  security infrastrucure is weak, 
> allowing common deployments without encryption of request and response 
> data or providing attackers the opportunity to easily obtain server execution 
> of substantively unauthenticated requests, with authentication presumptively
> provided by the clients (e.g. using AUTH_SYS), which themselves have not 
> been authenticated.

Forgive me, Dave. You removed the context, so I'm not certain which of
Magnus' comments you're responding to. Can you clarify?

--
Chuck Lever