Re: ietf-nntp Feedback on the 9/3 nntpext.

Brian Hernacki <bhern@netscape.com> Fri, 05 September 1997 21:47 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Sep 1997 14:42:28 -0700
From: Brian Hernacki <bhern@netscape.com>
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Subject: Re: ietf-nntp Feedback on the 9/3 nntpext.
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Larry Osterman (Exchange) wrote:
> 
> The reason a client might want to keep a connection open is to avoid
> re-authenticating a user.   Consider, for example an OTP system.  In
> such a system, the users credentials have a limited lifetime (typically
> several hundred iterations), after which the user needs to get a new set
> of credentials.
> 
> In such an environment, it is critical that clients minimize the number
> of authentications, and every server disconnection forces one of the
> passwords to be exhausted.
> 
> Also, on many systems authentication is quite slow (up to half a second
> or more), so clients try to avoid authentications as much as possible -
> and again, if the server disconnects, it causes unnecessary client
> slowdowns.

In that system, the admin would just set the timeout to be sufficiently
long.


> All I'm getting at is that I think that it makes sense for the NNTP
> draft to:
>         a) Mandate that timeouts are legal

I don't think there is any disagreement about timeouts being legal.


> and     b) Place some restrictions on a minimum length for that timeout.
> 
> I don't care what the minimum timeout is (1 minute :)), but there SHOULD
> be a minimum timeout.

Why? 


--brian