[Ntp] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-ntp-mac-05: (with COMMENT)

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ntp-mac-05: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Rich version of this review at:
https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3591



COMMENTS
S 3.
>      If authentication is implemented, then AES-CMAC as specified in RFC
>      4493 [RFC4493] SHOULD be computed over all fields in the NTP header,
>      and any extension fields that are present in the NTP packet as
>      described in RFC 5905 [RFC5905].  The MAC key for NTP MUST be at
>      least 128 bits long AES-128 key and the resulting MAC tag MUST be at
>      least 128 bits long as stated in section 2.4 of RFC 4493 [RFC4493].

Is there a way for either of these values to be > 128 bits? If not,
maube just say "must be 128 buts: