[Ntp] (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway! https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> Thu, 12 January 2023 19:20 UTC
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From: Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 19:20:37 +0000
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Subject: [Ntp] (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway! https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
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(good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway! https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function: "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the telephone network would not change the time!" So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival time so that when you get the correct time; It still works! In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 Minutes... you can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until... That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work. RS ***** sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html Code Speed https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html Chaos https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ RSA-PSS RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 PSK Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible) https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ AES-GCM SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ AES-CCM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ Compact TLS 1.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ DTLS 2023 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ TLS 1.2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html
- [Ntp] (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS… Duke Abbaddon