Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT
Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com> Tue, 08 December 2020 17:38 UTC
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From: Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com>
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Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 10:38:55 -0700
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To: Hal Murray <hmurray@megapathdsl.net>
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT
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> On Dec 7, 2020, at 7:28 PM, Hal Murray <hmurray@megapathdsl.net> wrote: > > [Context is putting the requester's address in the cookie so that a bad guy > can't get cookies from a server and then use them to DDoS somebody by > reflecting off a NTP+NTS server.] > > philipp@redfish-solutions.com said: >>> In the normal case, the IP Address in the cookie would match >>> the IP Address in the packet so there is no information leaked. > >> What about port-forwarding to a server behind a NATting firewall? I.e. >> 45.33.216.244. > > I don't see any information leaked. The NTP server doesn't know it's a NAT > box. The NTS-KE step would put the address of the NAT box into the initial > cookies. When the cookie came back from the NAT box, the address would match > and the returned new cookie would have the same address in it. > > If the client got a new IP Address via DHCP or whatever and was still behind > the same NAT box, things would keep working. > > ---------- > > The case where that would get leakage would be when the client goes from, for > example, work to home. If it uses work cookies from home, the server would > drop the requests due to address mismatch. That would happen with/without NAT > at home or work. If the server logged that mismatch that info could be used > to track somebody. If the server drops the packet without logging the info is > gone. > > There is potential leakage from statistical counters. If you can watch the > counters you might be able to correlate with the packet that just arrived. > But if you can see the arriving packets, you can probably see the lack of > responses. The IP Address within the cookie would be encrypted so seeing the > packet on the wire doesn't tell you where the cookie came from. > > ---------- > > Your question actually says "server behind a NATting firewall". The answer above was for the case of a client behind the NAT box. > > I don't see any leaks if the server is behind a NAT box. Do you have anything in mind? I don't see any way for the client to determine that there is NAT involved. My point was that the address stuffed into the cookie/nonce would mismatch the address in the source address of the IP packet once it got SNAT’d. It sounded like you were tacitly counting on the two being a match. -Philip > > Autokey didn't work through NAT boxes. I never got far enough with Autokey to understand the details. I assume an IP Address was tangled in the crypto. > > NTS and shared-key both work and are well tested through NAT. > > > -- > These are my opinions. I hate spam. > > > > _______________________________________________ > ntp mailing list > ntp@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ntp
- [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Salz, Rich
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Tony Finch
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Miroslav Lichvar
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Miroslav Lichvar
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Miroslav Lichvar
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Philip Prindeville
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Philip Prindeville
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Philip Prindeville
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Christer Weinigel
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Dieter Sibold
- Re: [Ntp] Rate limiting: DDoS, KoD, Pool, NAT Hal Murray