[nvo3] FW: Any use cases of Overlay network requesting IPSec connection from the Underlay for a specific time span? (was : Flow Security Policies exchanged over I2NSF service layer interface?

[Linda Dunbar <[e-mail]>]

NVO3 Participants,

I2NSF (Interface to Network Security function) has a work item in defining the flow security policy between domains (which includes inquiry of the capability from one domain to another and the actual flow policy rules from one domain to another).
Very often, the paths (or links) among nodes of a overlay network are provided by other network operators (a.k.a. "underlay network").  The flow policy rules are intended to filter out unwanted traffic from underlay network so that various attack traffic won't saturated the access links to the overlay nodes.

One interesting scenario brought up is Overlay nodes may need to request some traffic to be traversing IPsec channel. To achieve this goal, it is necessary for Overlay Network controller to inquire if the needed IPsec resource are even available before send the request (may even involve AAA process between controllers of each corresponding domain ).

Want to have a survey if people see the use case of Overlay Network needing portion of traffic to be through IPSec channel?
IPSec is supposed to be between two end nodes. Here we assume that the Overlay nodes don't have the resource or capability for IPsec, but expect IPsec between flow's ingress and egress nodes (i.e. NVE).

Any opinion is appreciated.
Thanks,
Linda

From: Linda Dunbar
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2016 4:03 PM
To: '[e-mail]'; BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Any use cases of Overlay network requesting IPSec connection from the Underlay for a specific time span? (was : Flow Security Policies exchanged over I2NSF service layer interface?

Christian,

Your feedback seems to suggest that Overlay network Controller may send request to the underlay network controller requesting IPsec connections among overlay nodes. Do I understand you correctly?

Are there any use cases of overlay network needing IPSec among their nodes only for a specific time span? i.e. Time based IPSec connection?

Linda

From: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Linda Dunbar; BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN
Subject: RE: Any feedback on the Protocol Independent Flow Security Policies exchanged over I2NSF service layer interface?


[snip]



Very often, the paths (or links) among nodes of a overlay network are provided by other network operators (a.k.a. "underlay network").  Very much like traditional networks placing FW (Firewall) or IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) on the wire to enforce the flow security rules, I2NSF Protocol Independent Flow Security Policies can be used by overlay networks to request certain flow based security rules to be enforced by its underlay networks, to prevent the unwanted attacks traffic from occupying the physical links and ports to the overlay network nodes, and to avoid the overlay nodes' CPU/Storage/Port utilization being consumed down by the various attacks.  Here is one example of "Overlay Video Communication network" exchange Flow Policies to the Underlay network.


[cid:image001.png@01D1B516.7F74E410]

[CJ] The above example clearly shows the necessary interaction between the two PDPs/controllers, to make sure that decisions made by the network controller accommodate the needs of the video customer as possibly expressed towards the video controller: for example, customer demands that the confidentiality of the videoconference needs to be preserved, thereby suggesting the use of the IPsec protocol suite. The video controller may enforce an IPsec design based upon the transport mode, whereas the network controller is solicited to allocate IPsec resources (read for example no AH, ESP in NULL mode) accordingly. This may possibly raise conflicting configuration tasks (the video controller uses AH, the network controller doesn't), thereby leading to inconsistency that may jeopardize the service. Whether BGP FS is used to carry security policy information between the two controllers is hardly the point, imho: what matters is the consistency of the (flow-based security policies enforced by both parties, and which should be derived from the customer's requirements (if any).
The goal of I2NSF is to specify the common information model and data model for the  Protocol Independent Flow Security Policies which can be queried and set between domains.
[CJ] OK.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fang-i2nsf-inter-cloud-ddos-mitigation-api/ is just the starting point. (needs more work to improve the clarity). We are asking if people to express their opinion on this work to the [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> list.
[CJ] I need to read this draft and will get back to you accordingly, but this may take a couple of weeks as I'm pretty busy for the time being.

I'll let Med further comment as appropriate.

Cheers,

Christian.

Thanks, Linda


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