[nvo3] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-nvo3-encap-10

Tero Kivinen via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 23 November 2023 19:17 UTC

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Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 11:17:18 -0800
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Subject: [nvo3] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-nvo3-encap-10
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Reviewer: Tero Kivinen
Review result: Has Nits

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This document is the result of the design team chartered to work on the 
common encapsulation that addresses the various technical concerns. It
does this by comparing three encapsulation protocols: Geneve, GUE, and
GPE. 

The security considerations section say:

   This document does not introduce any additional security constraints.

Which is true, as the document does not review the security (or lack of it)
in the encapsulation protocols, but section 6.2.2 do discuss about 
security/integrity extensions. It also recommends that the "the WG work on 
security options for Geneve." 

Nits:

Typo in section 6.4: 

  /svailable/available/

Invalid capitalization of IPsec in section 6.2.2 (twice) and once in section 7. 

  /IPSEC/IPsec/