Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06.txt: Collaborative attacks against a Verifier
Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> Thu, 26 October 2023 09:01 UTC
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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06.txt: Collaborative attacks against a Verifier
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Hi All, Section 11.6. is about "Key Binding" which is indeed an important security feature. However, in the context of "selective disclosure" while this feature is essential, it is insufficient. Let us take an example: If a Token indicates that an individual has the nationality X, in case of a collusion between two individuals and when using two pieces of software specifically developed for that purpose, an individual would be able to compute and transmit a Token to another individual for the benefit of that other individual in order to cheat a Verifier. This is a collusion between two individuals. The first individual may not have the knowledge of the private key but since he has the use of the private key, he is in a position to sign anything he wants. Since the Token does not include claims allowing to uniquely identity the individual, "if he is not seen, he will not be caught". "Collaborative attacks against a Verifier" should be added to the Security Considerations section. There exist ways to counter collaborative attacks against a Verifier. These ways should be mentioned in the core of the document. Denis > Hi all, > > this release of SD-JWT includes one important normative change, which > is a hash in the key binding JWT to ensure the integrity of > presentations. The second biggest change is that we restructured some > sections of the document to make it more readable. > > As always, we're looking forward to discussing SD-JWT here on the > mailing list and in Prague. > > -Daniel > > This is the full changelog: > > -06 > > * Added hash of Issuer-signed part and Disclosures in KB-JWT > > * Fix minor issues in some examples > > * Added IANA media type registration request for the JSON > Serialization > > * More precise wording around storing artifacts with sensitive data > > * The claim name _sd or ... must not be used in a disclosure. > > * Added JWT claims registration requests to IANA > * Ensure claims that control validity are checked after decoding > payload > > * Restructure sections around data formats and Example 1 > > * Update JSON Serialization to remove the kb_jwt member and allow > for the disclosures to be conveyed elsewhere > > * Expand the Enveloping SD-JWTs section to also discuss enveloping > JSON serialized SD-JWTs > > Am 23.10.23 um 18:17 schrieb internet-drafts@ietf.org: >> Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06.txt is now >> available. It is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol (OAUTH) WG of >> the IETF. >> >> Title: Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) >> Authors: Daniel Fett >> Kristina Yasuda >> Brian Campbell >> Name: draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06.txt >> Pages: 90 >> Dates: 2023-10-23 >> >> Abstract: >> >> This specification defines a mechanism for selective disclosure of >> individual elements of a JSON object used as the payload of a JSON >> Web Signature (JWS) structure. It encompasses various applications, >> including but not limited to the selective disclosure of JSON Web >> Token (JWT) claims. >> >> The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/ >> >> There is also an HTML version available at: >> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06.html >> >> A diff from the previous version is available at: >> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-06 >> >> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at: >> rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > -- > Please use my new email address:mail@danielfett.de > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
- [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selective… internet-drafts
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Watson Ladd
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-selec… Neil Madden