Re: [OAUTH-WG] Reuse of "state" across different AS in draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state-08

[John Bradley <[e-mail]>]

Thanks

On Sat, May 19, 2018, 3:09 PM Daniel Fett <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> Am 18.05.2018 um 18:20 schrieb John Bradley:
>
> I am not against having "as" as REQUIRED.
>
> While we are at it should we recommend that rfp be single use?
>
> If the state JWT is *not* signed and the client has no other means to
> check the integrity of the JWT (e.g., by storing a copy in the browser's
> session), rfp MUST be single use, where single use means that once a new
> authorization request has been sent, all old "rfp" values (for that browser
> session) become invalid.
> (Rationale: The state reuse attack across AS would still be possible,
> since an attacker could just replace the "as" value in an unsigned JWT.)
>
> If the state JWT is signed and "as" is contained in the JWT, rfp does not
> need to be single use in this sense.
>
> To prevent defense-in-depth against the usage of leaked of state values,
> in both cases, a state value that has once been accepted at the redirection
> endpoint SHOULD be invalidated for future uses. In the the case of an
> unsigned JWT, this means that a specific rfp value SHOULD only be accepted
> once. If the JWT is signed, it would be sufficient to memorize the hashes
> of used JWTs or their jti values, and decline JWTs with the same hash/jti.
> (SHOULD since this is impossible for stateless clients.)
>
> (Overall, it seems like not signing state JWTs is not a good idea.)
>
>
> This draft hangs around as a ID and probably is not read by most people.
>
> We may also want to mention it in security topics if we haven't.
>
> I will check the status there.
>
>
> I need to update this in the next couple of weeks to keep it from expiring
> anyway.
>
> I took a cursory look at the draft and I see two more issues:
>
> (1)
>
> > The "as" claim if present MUST correspond to the URI endpoint registered
> as the "redirect_uri" for that AS.
>
> This wording is not sufficient:
> - The AS must be the expected AS (if there are means to check that, for
> example the browser session).
> - The redirection URI on which the authorization response was actually
> received matches the "as" value.
>
> (2)
>
> > The client parses it as a JWT.  It then verifies the signature of the
> JWT (if signed)
>
> The client should check the signature if it expects the JWT to be signed,
> not only if the received JWT is signed. I may be nitpicking here, but
> developers should not be lead to believe that "if signed(received_jwt):
> check_sig(received_jwt)" would be a good implementation choice.
>
> - Daniel
>
> --
> SEC - Institute of Information Security
> University of Stuttgart
> Phone [phone]
> Universitätsstraße 38 - 70569 Stuttgart - Room 2.434
>
>