Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02.txt

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Sat, 09 November 2013 13:24 UTC

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Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2013 14:23:56 +0100
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02.txt
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Hi Nat,

what's the rationale for having different algorithms to produce a code 
challenges? As this may cause interop issues there should be good 
reasons to introduce variants.

regards,
Torsten.


Am 19.10.2013 12:15, schrieb Nat Sakimura:
> Incorporated the discussion at Berlin meeting and after in the ML.
>
> Best,
>
> Nat
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org <mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>>
> Date: 2013/10/19
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02.txt
> To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com <mailto:sakimura@gmail.com>>, 
> John Bradley <jbradley@pingidentity.com 
> <mailto:jbradley@pingidentity.com>>, Naveen Agarwal <naa@google.com 
> <mailto:naa@google.com>>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Nat Sakimura and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Filename:        draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse
> Revision:        02
> Title:           OAuth Symmetric Proof of Posession for Code Extension
> Creation date:   2013-10-19
> Group:           Individual Submission
> Number of pages: 8
> URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02.txt
> Status: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse
> Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02
> Diff: http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-02
>
> Abstract:
>    The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing authorization code grant is
>    susceptible to the code interception attack.  This specification
>    describe a mechanism that acts as a control against this threat.
>
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of 
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org 
> <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
>
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