Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Device Flow LC Comment (and OpenID Connect)

William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com> Tue, 02 January 2018 22:38 UTC

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From: William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 14:38:12 -0800
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To: "Hollenbeck, Scott" <shollenbeck@verisign.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Device Flow LC Comment (and OpenID Connect)
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On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 6:32 AM Hollenbeck, Scott <shollenbeck@verisign.com>
wrote:

> I have reviewed draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-07. Just one comment
> regarding Section 5.1:
>
> Would it be possible to suggest some minimally acceptable entropy value?
> The text says "The user code SHOULD have enough entropy that when combined
> with rate limiting makes a brute-force attack infeasible", but just how
> much entropy is enough?
>

There are a few challenges with requiring a minimum entropy of the
user_code due to the fact it's user-visible. Normally we would just set a
nice high number (like OAuth did
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.10>) and that would be
fine, as normally a few extra bytes on the token is no problem. With the
user_code however, the longer it is the harder it is to use. My expectation
is that the authorization server would determine their own acceptable
amount of entropy, trading off security for usability and taking into
account the expiry time of the code, and any brute-force mitigations they
have in place such as rate limiting.

Do you have any text to suggest?


> A related question: the last call made me wonder if there are any plans to
> add a device flow for OpenID Connect. Does anyone know if such a thing is
> in the works?
>

The Google implementation of the device flow already supports OpenID
Connect. Just add "openid" to the scopes in the request as you normally
would, and you'll get an ID Token on the response.

There isn't any effort that I'm aware of to document this. We could do it I
guess if there was demand, it would be quite a short document.



> Scott
>
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