[OAUTH-WG] Preventing phishing attacks with auth server verification?

Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> Tue, 06 December 2011 17:42 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2011 09:42:02 -0800
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From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Preventing phishing attacks with auth server verification?
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Has there been any discussion about supporting a 2-stage login similar to
what many banks are doing, where they show you an image or a word that you
previously chose so that you can verify you're talking to the right server?

For example, when I log in to my bank I first enter my username. Then they
show me my secret word, and if I recognize it, I enter my password. This
gives me a chance to verify the server I'm logging in to really is my bank,
and not a third party intercepting my login attempt.

It seems that this would be a nice way to solve the security concern around
embedded user agents in mobile apps.

I realize this would not be part of the OAuth spec since this describes how
to sign in to the authorization server. But I'm curious if this would allow
native apps (especially mobile apps) to safely use an embedded browser to
complete the OAuth flow? Or is the general consensus that opening an
external browser is better because the user may already be signed in in
that session?

Aaron Parecki
Geoloqi.com