Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice?
Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Sun, 05 November 2023 19:35 UTC
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Reply-To: Dick.Hardt@gmail.com
From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 05 Nov 2023 11:35:13 -0800
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron=40parecki.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Daniel Fett <fett=40danielfett.de@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice?
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For example, Auth0 has not set any CSP on this endpoint: https://securityheaders.com/?q=https%3A%2F%2Fauth0.openai.com The CSP recommendations are buried in the BCP currently On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:28 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: > The cookie and header recommendations I am thinking of would be for the AS > as well as the client. > > A number of XSS attacks can be thwarted by a modern browser and the right > HTTP headers. > > My question is: Did the authors consider adding cookie and header > recommendations, and decided it was too general? > > Cookie and header best security practices have been around for years -- > I'm not suggesting we make anything up -- I'm suggesting we raise > awareness. > > I consider myself to be fairly security aware, and I was not aware of some > of the HTTP headers that are best security practice. > > /Dick > > > On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:19 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron= > 40parecki.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > >> I don't think it's necessary to say "do the right things with cookies" in >> the Security BCP. The Browser Apps BCP has a much deeper discussion of how >> different browser-based architectures work with cookies so that seems like >> a better place to actually have a real discussion about it. >> >> Also +1 to what Daniel said about not continuing to add little things. >> Plus I think it's too late anyway, publication has already been requested >> for the Security BCP. >> >> Aaron >> >> On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:14 AM Daniel Fett <fett= >> 40danielfett.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >> >>> I agree with Aaron! >>> >>> Also we should be very careful about any additions to the Security BCP >>> at this point. It is very easy to re-start the "one more thing" loop we've >>> been stuck in for the last years. There may be more useful things to say, >>> but we should put them on the list for a future second version of the BCP. >>> >>> -Daniel >>> Am 05.11.23 um 20:03 schrieb Aaron Parecki: >>> >>> I don't think the Security BCP should incorporate cookie best practices >>> directly in the document. If anything, it sounds like possibly a candidate >>> for inclusion in the Browser Apps BCP. >>> >>> There are already some mentions of these cookie properties mentioned in >>> the Browser Apps BCP, though only in reference to specific architectures, >>> not as a general best practice. For example: >>> >>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-15.html#pattern-bff-cookie-security >>> >>> Aaron >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 10:48 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Hey >>>> >>>> I was reviewing security on some sites I managed and checked to see if >>>> the recommendations were in the BCP. >>>> >>>> I don't see anything around cookies such as httpOnly, sameSite, secure. >>>> >>>> I saw some HTTP security header suggestions buried in 4.16 >>>> (X-Frame-Options, CSP), but not for Strict-Transport-Security, >>>> Permissions-Policy, or X-Content-Type-Options, and the CSP guidance is >>>> rather vague. >>>> >>>> I understand these are general web security best practices, and perhaps >>>> I missed it, but I think it would be useful to call out that best security >>>> practices around cookies and headers should also be followed in Section 2, >>>> and either have the best practices included, or direct the reader where to >>>> find them. >>>> >>>> /Dick >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Securit… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Giuseppe De Marco
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Philippe De Ryck
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Philippe De Ryck
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cookies & headers in OAuth 2.0 Sec… Philippe De Ryck