Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth token entropy

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Fri, 02 November 2012 21:40 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 18:40:08 -0300
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Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth token entropy
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The change we did to the last ish draft of OAuth to have the client send its client ID to the token endpoint even if it is not using a password reduces the need for additional entropy.

Originally for public clients using code, an attacker had the address space of all the inflight codes for all clients.   We reduced that to only being able to attack one client_id at a time.

For confidential clients it should not be possible to brute force the token endpoint.  

Trying to explain all the issues is hard so those are not bad defaults,  128 bits is a 20 character character password using the printable ascii character set for out of band code delivery.

John B.
On 2012-11-02, at 3:58 PM, Oleg Gryb <oleg_gryb@yahoo.com> wrote:

> 
> Thanks, Brian. "Must" for 128 bits makes perfect sense. 160 bits looks good as a recommended entropy as well.
> 
> WG,
> 
> Please update the doc. It's important to provide clear guidelines for OAuth implementers, which are many nowadays. 
> 
> --- On Fri, 11/2/12, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> 
> From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth token entropy
> To: "Oleg Gryb" <oleg@gryb.info>
> Cc: "Torsten Lodderstedt" <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, "oauth" <oauth@ietf.org>
> Date: Friday, November 2, 2012, 2:19 PM
> 
> I believe the original text (which was borrowed from elsewhere) had a must followed by a should rather than two shoulds like that. The text seems to have drifted a bit in various places but the threat model text should probably be aligned with what's in core OAuth at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.10
> 
> 
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 10:16 AM, Oleg Gryb <oleg_gryb@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Can somebody please provide clarification for this:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-05#section-5.1.4.2.2
> 
> 
> 
> 5.1.4.2.2.  High entropy of secrets
> 
> ...
>    The probability of any two Authorization Code
>    values being identical should be less than or equal to 2^(-128) and
>    should be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
> 
> 
> Is there any reason why we have two inclusive conditions in this statement or is it a typo and you meant something else?
>  
> 
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