Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection in RFC7662 : Refresh token?

Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> Mon, 02 March 2020 05:11 UTC

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From: Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2020 21:11:40 -0800
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To: David Waite <david@alkaline-solutions.com>
Cc: Bill Jung <bjung=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection in RFC7662 : Refresh token?
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How would the authorization server know who actually uses the
introspection endpoint assuming that a protected resource and a client
application use the same credentials (client_id and client_secret)?

Regards,
Andrii

On Sun, Mar 1, 2020 at 7:38 PM David Waite <david@alkaline-solutions.com> wrote:
>
> I would expect the AS to invalidate the refresh token in this case, which would not require a refresh token mode nor necessarily any signaling back to the resource.
>
> -DW
>
> > On Mar 1, 2020, at 12:12 AM, Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hello Bill,
> >
> > I'm just thinking out loud about possible scenarios for a protected
> > resource here... It may decide to revoke a refresh token if a client
> > application tried to use it instead of an access token when the
> > protected resource is paranoid about security. In order to do that an
> > introspection response should include a non-standard parameter which
> > indicates that the requested token is refresh_token.
> >
> > A user of the introspection endpoint should rely only on a value of
> > the active parameter (which is a boolean indicator) of the endpoint
> > response. This applies to both types of tokens. Note, the expiration
> > date, as well as other parameters, are defined as optional in the
> > specification. Both token types can be revoked before the expiration
> > date comes even if this parameter is presented as part of the
> > response. In my opinion, there are a number of reasons why this check
> > (for a refresh token) can be useful on the client application side.
> >
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Andrii
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 1:59 AM Bill Jung
> > <bjung=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello, hopefully I am using the right email address.
> >>
> >> Simply put, can this spec be enhanced to clarify "Who can use the introspection endpoint for a refresh token? A resource provider or a client app or both?"
> >>
> >> RFC7662 clearly mentions that the user of introspection endpoint is a 'protected resource' and that makes sense for an access token. If we allow this to client apps, it'll give unnecessary token information to them.
> >> However, the spec also mentions that refresh tokens can also be used against the endpoint.
> >> In case of refresh tokens, user of the endpoint should be a client app because refresh tokens are used by clients to get another access token. (Cannot imagine how/why a resource server would introspect a refresh token)
> >>
> >> Is it correct to assume that the endpoint should be allowed to client apps if they want to examine refresh token's expiry time? Then the RFC should clearly mention it.
> >>
> >> Thanks in advance.
> >>
> >> <Details from the spec>
> >> In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7662
> >> In '1.  Introduction' section says,
> >> "This specification defines a protocol that allows authorized
> >> protected resources to query the authorization server to determine
> >> the set of metadata for a given token that was presented to them by
> >> an OAuth 2.0 client."
> >> Above makes clear that user of the endpoint is a "protected resource".
> >>
> >> And under 'token' in '2.1.  Introspection Request' section says,
> >> "For refresh tokens,
> >> this is the "refresh_token" value returned from the token endpoint
> >> as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], Section 5.1."
> >> So looks like a refresh token is allowed for this endpoint.
> >>
> >>
> >> Bill Jung
> >> Manager, Response Engineering
> >> bjung@pingidentity.com
> >> w: +1 604.697.7037
> >> Connect with us:
> >>
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