Re: [OAUTH-WG] Adam Roach's Discuss on draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: iesg [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Adam Roach via
> Datatracker
> Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 1:05 AM
> To: The IESG <[e-mail]>
> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; oauth-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Adam Roach's Discuss on draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06: (with DISCUSS
> and COMMENT)
> 
> Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-06: Discuss
> 
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> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> 
> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for everyone who worked to get this document out the door. I found
> it to be well-organized and easy to read.
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> This is a process discuss for Roman to handle, and I plan to clear it during the
> IESG formal telechat.
> 
> This document is intended for BCP status. It has a normative reference to
> RFC 8017, which is an informational document. Checking the last call text
> (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-
> bcp/edit/lastcalltext/),
> there is no mention of RFC 8017, nor does RFC 8017 appear in the downref
> registry (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/).
> 
> Thanks to RFC 8067, we are not required to run this document through IETF
> LC again (and, given that RFC 8017's predecessor, RFC 3447, is in the registry,
> we probably don't want to). However, we'll need to minute that the point
> was raised and addressed. There is also at least one additional requirement
> imposed by section 2 of RFC 8067 that needs to be satisfied (see the last
> sentence in that section).

Good catch.  This is my fault.  The caution of the downref was in the shepherd write-up (thanks Hannes).

I share your view that since RFC8017 (not in downref registry but referenced here) obsoletes RFC3447 (in the downref registry), we don't need to re-run the LC (per Section 2 of RFC8067).  Is there concern with this course of action?

Roman


> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> §3.2:
> 
> >  That said, if a JWT is cryptographically protected by a transport
> > layer, such as TLS using cryptographically current algorithms, there
> > may be no need to apply another layer of cryptographic protections to
> > the JWT.
> 
> It may be helpful to distinguish between end-to-end TLS encryption (such as
> that seen in HTTPS, even in the presence of proxies) and hop-by-hop TLS
> encryption (such as that seen in SIPS when proxies are present). In the latter
> case, intermediaries may perform attacks that would otherwise only be
> possible to mount by the endpoints.
> 
> My concrete suggestion is to modify the above text to read "...protected
> end-to-end by a transport layer, such as..."
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> §3.2:
> 
> >  -  Avoid all RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 [RFC2313] encryption algorithms,
> >     preferring RSA-OAEP ([RFC8017], Sec. 7.1).
> 
> It's not clear to me what this recommendation intends to say regarding the
> algorithms in RFC 2437 and RFC 3447. One might infer that they're deprecated
> as well. If this is the intention, please be explicit.
>