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[OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Sat, 23 April 2016 11:47 UTC

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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2016 13:47:06 +0200
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection
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Hi all,

discussion about Mix-Up and CnP seems to have stopped after the session 
in BA - at least in the OAuth WG. There is a discussion about 
mitigations in OpenId Connect going on at the OpenId Connect mailing list.

I'm very much interested to find a solution within the OAuth realm as 
I'm not interested to either implement two solutions (for OpenId Connect 
and OAuth) or adopt a OpenId-specific solution to OAuth (use id! tokens 
in the front channel). I therefore would like to see progress and 
propose to continue the discussion regarding mitigations for both threats.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 
proposes reasonable mitigations for both attacks. There are alternatives 
as well:
- mix up:
-- AS specific redirect uris
-- Meta data/turi 
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5)
- CnP:
-- use of the nonce parameter (as a distinct mitigation beside state for 
counter XSRF)

Anyone having an opinion?

best regards,
Torsten.

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