Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT BCP on Compression in JWE

Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com> Sat, 29 July 2017 18:32 UTC

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From: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>
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Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 08:32:51 -1000
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To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT BCP on Compression in JWE
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Yaron,

As a developer, I can think of many scenarios where the attacker controls some of the plaintext yet I still need encryption services of some kind. What are the proper crypto controls that allow developers to do this safely? I think that's the better question right now.

Aloha,
--
Jim Manico
@Manicode

> On Jul 28, 2017, at 7:57 PM, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:
> 
> Hi Brian,
> 
> These two attacks on TLS are only examples of the breakage that can occur when the adversary can control the plaintext to some degree (even a small piece of the plaintext, e.g. a malleable HTTP cookie can result in decryption of the whole message). Similar attacks were demonstrated in IPsec. Can you please add details on why typical use of JWT would not be susceptible to these attacks?
> 
> Thanks,
>    Yaron
> 
>> On critique of JWT I've seen a few times can be paraphrased as "JWT
>> supports compressed plaintext so, because of CRIME and BREACH, it is
>> dangerous and stupid."  It's very possible that I am stupid (many on this
>> list will likely attest to it) but I don't see the applicability of those
>> kinds of chosen plaintext attacks aimed at recovering sensitive data to how
>> JWT/JWE are typically used.
>> 
>> I think it would be useful, if during the development of the JWT BCP, the
>> authors or chairs or WG could somehow engage some experts (CFRG?) to
>> understand if there's any real practical advice that can be given about
>> using compression with JWE and the risks involved.
>> 
> 
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