Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-10.txt

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 28 June 2013 13:54 UTC

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Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 14:54:29 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-10.txt
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Hi,

On 06/16/2013 10:28 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> the new revision addresses DISCUSSES and comments raised during IESG
> evaluation:
> 
> - DISCUSS by Barry Leiba: incoporated Barry's text proposal - it
> strengthens requirements on the authorization server to immediately
> revoke tokens while acknowledging the practical constraints on change
> propagation among distributed servers
> - D2 by Richard Barnes: changed text to refer to respective section of
> RFC 6749 on TLS version
> - description of revocation endpoint URL now refers to respective
> section of RFC 6749 (comment by Sean Turner)
> - added intro to IANA section (comment by Joel Jaeggli)
> - some nits and editorial changes - should cover all comments raised
> during IESG evaluation
> 
> There are two open issues
> - discussion regarding the TLS version on the list
> - DISCUSS regarding the mandate to use TLS (D1/Richard Barnes)

Can we please close these on the list so we don't have to
spend time on 'em in Berlin?

As a reminder Richard's discuss says:

D1. The mandate for TLS usage actually seems backward here.  Suppose
a server receives a request over HTTP.  At this point, the
credentials have been exposed, so you would *want* the token to be
invalidated!  Suggest: -- Clients MUST NOT send over HTTP -- Server
revocation URIs MUST be HTTPS -- Servers MAY support HTTP to the
corresponding URI, just in case the client screws up

D2. Why are the requirements TLS versions different here than in
RFC 6749? Especially in a way that makes them worse.  Suggest
deleting the sentence starting "The authorization server MUST
support TLS 1.0 ..."

Thanks,
S.


> 
> regards,
> Torsten.
> 
> Am 16.06.2013 11:13, schrieb internet-drafts@ietf.org:
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>>   This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol Working
>> Group of the IETF.
>>
>>     Title           : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
>>     Author(s)       : Torsten Lodderstedt
>>                            Stefanie Dronia
>>                            Marius Scurtescu
>>     Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-10.txt
>>     Pages           : 11
>>     Date            : 2013-06-16
>>
>> Abstract:
>>     This document proposes an additional endpoint for OAuth authorization
>>     servers, which allows clients to notify the authorization server that
>>     a previously obtained refresh or access token is no longer needed.
>>     This allows the authorization server to cleanup security credentials.
>>     A revocation request will invalidate the actual token and, if
>>     applicable, other tokens based on the same authorization grant.
>>
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-revocation
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-10
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-10
>>
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
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