Re: [OAUTH-WG] A few questions to draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-06

William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com> Thu, 12 October 2017 17:11 UTC

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From: William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 10:10:50 -0700
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To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A few questions to draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-06
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Hi Nat,

Thanks for reviewing the draft!

On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 9:57 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks to the authors for coming up with this document.
> The scenario is very close to what I implemented back in 2011 or so, so I
> am naturally interested.
>
> Here are some questions I have with the draft.
>
> 1) Am I correct to assume that the draft targeting a device that is
> completely unable to accept user input?
>

The spec itself requires zero input on the primary device (it's an exercise
to the implementor on how to trigger it, etc).


> 2) I feel that it is appropriate to mention the shoulder hacking as well.
> In the Kiosk kind of use cases, the screen might be watched by the remote
> camera and the "session" might be hijacked by the remote attacker. (This is
> why I am asking 1) above. If the device has a capability to accept a
> number, the risk can be made much lower. )
>

We should add this as a security consideration.


> 3) It probably is better to explicitly say that "device code MUST NOT be
> displayed" especially in the case of a public client.
>

Agreed.


> 4) Does section 3.4 and 3.5 exclude the possibility of using something
> like web socket?
>

We are specifying a very basic approach assuming highly constrained
clients. I like the idea of doing better than simple polling but not sure
how to best add this and keep the spec streamlined. One thought was a HTTP2
long poll where the server just keeps the connection open, which I believe
is possible as specified (though we don't mention it, and I don't have
experience with this).


> 5) If my read is correct, the client is doing the polling etc. by itself
> and not spawning a system browser.
>

Correct.


> In a Kiosk kind of use case, I can imagine a case that the original app
> spawning a browser -- i.e, doing PKCE. In this case, the authorization
> server creates user authentication and authorization page that displays the
> verification URI and the user code. The client does nothing but a regular
> PKCE. This kind of use case is out of scope for this document, is it
> correct?
>

I don't quite follow, can you elaborate?

Cheers,
William


>
> Cheers,
>
> Nat Sakimura
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Nat Sakimura
>
> Chairman of the Board, OpenID Foundation
>
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