Re: [OAUTH-WG] Clarification: authorization server matching of redirect URI

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Mon, 19 April 2010 17:23 UTC

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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Clarification: authorization server matching of redirect URI
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On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 8:39 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
>> The first is before redirecting the user to the callback URI.  This seems
>> doomed to being service provider specific, unfortunately.
>
> I agree. If someone wants to suggest some security consideration text that would be good.

See page 9: http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/attachment/wiki/SecurityConsiderations/OAuth%20WRAP%202.0%20Security%20Considerations.pdf

Cheers,
Brian