Re: [OAUTH-WG] Endpoint Misconfiguration / Social Engineering Attack

Dave Tonge <dave.tonge@momentumft.co.uk> Thu, 08 October 2020 12:31 UTC

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From: Dave Tonge <dave.tonge@momentumft.co.uk>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2020 14:30:55 +0200
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To: Guido Schmitz <g.schmitz@gtrs.de>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Endpoint Misconfiguration / Social Engineering Attack
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Hi Guido

We've also discussed this issue in the FAPI Working Group at the OpenID
Foundation.
We came to the conclusion that we should require the use of either RFC8414
or OpenID Connect Discovery.

I'd be in favour of adding the recommendation to the BCP.

I'm not aware of an attack in the wild in this area, but I'm definitely
aware of quite a bit of misconfiguration of clients. We've had a problem in
the UK OpenBanking space where alternative authorization endpoints were
communicated via email or hosted PDFs. In my mind this opens up social
engineering attacks that are much less likely when RFC8414 is used.

Dave



On Thu, 8 Oct 2020 at 14:18, Guido Schmitz <g.schmitz@gtrs.de> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> We just had a discussion in Stuttgart on the possibility of
> misconfigured endpoints, i.e., an honest client uses the wrong endpoints
> for interacting with some honest AS. Such a setting might be the outcome
> of a social engineering attack against the administrators of a client
> (e.g., the attacker disguises as an AS support agent and convinces the
> client admin that some endpoint needs to be changed). If some endpoint
> is configured to a URL controlled by some adversary, critical data can
> leak and the attacker can even tamper with the requests to this endpoint.
>
> Is this a realistic attack scenario? Does anybody have more insight or
> data on this problem? (I think that such a scenario had been mentioned
> at some OSW discussion.)
>
> A potential mitigation against this problem could be the usage of AS
> metadata discovery (RFC8414). In this case, the client only needs to set
> the "issuer" to configure the endpoint URLs. A social engineering attack
> to change the issuer might be less likely as a social engineering attack
> to change some endpoint URLs (which a client admin might have less
> understanding of). Further, using AS metadata discovery also reduces the
> risk of misconfiguration at the client in general. Maybe it is a good
> idea to add a recommendation for the usage of RFC8414 in the security
> BCP. What do you think?
>
> Regards,
>
> Guido
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>


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