Re: [OAUTH-WG] Alissa Cooper's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-11: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 03 August 2018 23:37 UTC

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Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2018 18:37:11 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: William Denniss <wdenniss=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, oauth-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Alissa Cooper's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-11: (with COMMENT)
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On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 11:41:05AM -0700, William Denniss wrote:
> Alissa,
> 
> Thank you for your review. Replies inline:
> 
> On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 8:58 AM, Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in> wrote:
> 
> >
> > Section 3.3:
> >
> > "It is NOT RECOMMENDED for authorization servers to include the user
> >    code in the verification URI ("verification_uri"), as this increases
> >    the length and complexity of the URI that the user must type."
> >
> > I don't fully understand the justification for the normative requirement
> > here.
> > The user ultimately ends up typing in both strings, right? Is it so much
> > more
> > complex to type them both into a browser bar contiguously than to type the
> > uri
> > into the browser bar and the code into some form field on the page such
> > that
> > the normative requirement is warranted?
> >
> 
> Yes, the user will need to type both strings regardless.
> 
> The main reason for the recommended separation is that the URI can't be
> validated/corrected – either they type it correctly and they get to the
> page, or they don't. But for the user-code, the page can display an error
> if the user types it wrong. The belief is that it's a better user
> experience that they get to the page, and then continue the input from
> there rather than get browser errors if they typed the user-code part of
> the URI wrong.

I am hardly a URI expert, so salt as appropriate, but if the user code was
in the query string, would the server still be able to generate a useful
error page if the user code was typed incorrectly?

-Benjamin