Re: [OAUTH-WG] Client authentication requirement

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Wed, 15 June 2011 18:47 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 12:47:20 -0600
Message-ID: <BANLkTi=EAr2oH9JAX4gaEgRqbS-jeU4N-g@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Client authentication requirement
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Also seems this is related to the topic of native/mobile clients.  As I
understand it, native apps using the authorization code grant/flow have been
the primary motivator for keeping client authentication optional.  Anonymous
client have come up too.



On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 11:26 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>wrote:

> Client authentication has been one of the main problem areas in OAuth 1.0
> and 2.0 does nothing to resolve it (arguably, it makes it more confusing).
>
>
>
> Because of the desire to allow any client type in any deployment
> environment, we ended up with a barely defined client authentication model.
> We offer password-based client authentication using HTTP Basic (and an
> alternative parameter), but leave it optional.
>
>
>
> It has been suggested that by doing so, we have made the protocol security
> hard to define and harder to implement properly. The document was written
> largely with the requirement to use client authentication with any request
> to the access token endpoint. However, it does allow unauthenticated
> requests in section 3.
>
>
>
> Are there any other client properties than the client’s ability to
> authenticate with regards to security?
>
>
>
> We have one grant type without client authentication (implicit), two with
> optional authentication (authorization code and username/password), and one
> with required authentication (client credentials).
>
>
>
> I would like to go back to requiring client authentication for the access
> token endpoint, using HTTP Basic or other schemes. To leave the door open
> for clients incapable of authenticating to use the endpoint, we will add a
> security consideration section discussing the ramifications of using the
> access token endpoint without client authentication.
>
>
>
> This suggestions is linked to the topic of refresh tokens which I’ll post
> separately.
>
>
>
> EHL
>
>
>
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