Re: [OAUTH-WG] [kitten] OAuth Discovery and what the relying partyneeds to know

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Thu, 10 May 2012 14:58 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 10:58:35 -0400
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To: "Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng)" <kwiereng@cisco.com>
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Cc: kitten@ietf.org, oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [kitten] OAuth Discovery and what the relying partyneeds to know
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openID Connect dosen't require a user portion of the identifier to be discovered and supports a opaque or pseudonymous user_id.    
email is an optional attribute that can be returned by user consent.

OpenID 2.0 actively discouraged using email addresses for privacy reasons.  Teaching people to enter there email addresses into unknown sites was seen as a bad thing by many.

WF was started partially as an alternative discovery mechanism for openID to allow people to enter email addresses to discover there IdP, given a belief that users could only be asked to enter email and 
NASCAR UI was not scalable.

openID is attempting to separately address the NASCAR problem with it's Account Chooser project to allow the user to configure and control their selection of IdP without entering info directly into the RP.

For WF/SWD the decision is to enforce discovery by host only or support a user component so that a email or other service provider could allow per user choice.

I do happen to personally agree that teaching users to give up there email to random websites is not a good idea, however not allowing a user component in discovery won't stop RP from asking and removes otherwise useful functionality and choice fro the user.

John B.

On 2012-05-10, at 1:43 AM, Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng) wrote:

> 
> Hmmm, I see your point but I think that from a privacy PoV revealing the username to the RP is not good practice, especially not prior to trust being established between RP and IdP. If the IdP wants to send the assertion in the authentication statement that is another matter. But you don't want rogue RPs harvesting user names. So instead i have assumed that the domain could be more specific if needed, i.e. for 99% of the cases example.com would suffice but for the corner cases I imagine using idp1.example.com and idp2.example.com. But I understand that in an oauth scenario that may be less pretty.
> 
> Klaas
> 
> Sent from my iPad
> 
> On 9 mei 2012, at 21:31, "John Bradley" <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> 
>> The lookup is based on the identifier provided by the user.  It can have a user portion in the format of a URI https://john@example.com , https://example.com/john or anything else where you can extract the domain.
>> 
>> The user portion is necessary to allow for per user IdP delegation.   Otherwise only one IdP per host could be supported.
>> 
>> John B.
>> 
>> 
>> On 2012-05-09, at 2:42 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi John, 
>>> 
>>> does the "identifier" contain of a domain part AND a username part or only the domain part? 
>>> That's the crucial question here. 
>>> 
>>> Ciao
>>> Hannes
>>> 
>>> On May 9, 2012, at 9:20 PM, John Bradley wrote:
>>> 
>>>> For openID Connect we are using the identifier to discover the AS.   We refer to that as an issuer,  and perform a second discovery step to get the configuration (Auth endpoint, token endpoint, user_info endpoint and other config) for that issuer.
>>>> 
>>>> SWD/WF may be used for other things by other protocols, but our use is quite simple.
>>>> 
>>>> I think that is probably the same thing for SASL,  but others may think differently.
>>>> 
>>>> John B.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 2012-05-09, at 1:50 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Hi guys, 
>>>>> 
>>>>> at the last IIW we had a discussion about SASL-OAuth and what the SASL server needs to know for discovery. 
>>>>> The discovery discussions around WebFinger go in the same directions. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> So, I have been wondering whether we have made an informed decision about how the discovery procedure is actually supposed to look like. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> In my view, the relying party (the client) only needs to know who the identity provider (the AS/RS) is. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Any other views? 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Ciao
>>>>> Hannes
>>>>> 
>>>>> PS: Please let me know if I should provide more background about the issue. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
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