Re: [OAUTH-WG] redirect uri and portals

Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Tue, 07 March 2023 14:07 UTC

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To: Yannick Majoros <yannick@valuya.be>, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] redirect uri and portals
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Hi Yannick,


Am 07.03.2023 um 14:25 schrieb Yannick Majoros:
> One possible solution: Store the redirect information in a signed JWT
> and place the JWT in the state parameter. I don't think this is
> written somewhere in the security BCP but I think this is a solutions
> used in the wild by multiple clients.

Section 4.7.1 of the security BCP lists this solution as one possible
countermeasure:

  *

    If|state|is used for carrying application state, and integrity of
    its contents is a concern, clients MUST protect|state|against
    tampering and swapping. This can be achieved by binding the contents
    of state to the browser session and/or signed/encrypted state values
    as discussed in the now-expired
    draft[I-D.bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state
    <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state-09.txt>].ΒΆ
    <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#section-4.7.1-3.2.1>


The referenced draft has, however, expired:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state-09.txt


Ciao

Hannes