Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4
David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> Wed, 29 March 2006 17:02 UTC
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Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2006 11:37:56 -0500
From: David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
To: ietf-openpgp@imc.org
Subject: Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4
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Here is round four. Only little fiddle changes at this point. ================================== Section 5.2.2 (Version 3 Signature Packet Format) says: DSA signatures MUST use hashes with a size of 160 bits, to match q, the size of the group generated by the DSA key's generator value. The hash function result is treated as a 160 bit number and used directly in the DSA signature algorithm. change to: DSA signatures MUST use hashes that are equal in size to the number of bits of q, the group generated by the DSA key's generator value. If the output size of the chosen hash is larger than the number of bits of q, the hash result is truncated to fit by taking the number of leftmost bits equal to the number of bits of q. This (possibly truncated) hash function result is treated as a number and used directly in the DSA signature algorithm. No change. ================================== Section 12.5. (DSA) says: An implementation SHOULD NOT implement DSA keys of size less than 1024 bits. Note that present DSA is limited to a maximum of 1024 bit keys, which are recommended for long-term use. Also, DSA keys MUST be an even multiple of 64 bits long. change to: An implementation SHOULD NOT implement DSA keys of size less than 1024 bits or with a q size of less than 160 bits. DSA keys MUST also be a multiple of 64 bits, and the q size MUST be a multiple of 8 bits. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS186] specifies that DSA be used in one of the following ways: * 1024-bit key, 160-bit q, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash * 2048-bit key, 224-bit q, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash * 2048-bit key, 256-bit q, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash * 3072-bit key, 256-bit q, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash The above key and q size pairs were chosen to best balance the strength of the key with the strength of the hash. Implementations SHOULD use one of the above key and q size pairs when generating DSA keys. If DSS compliance is desired, one of the specified SHA hashes must be used as well. [FIPS186] is the ultimate authority on DSS, and should be consulted for all questions of DSS compliance. Note that earlier versions of this standard only allowed a 160-bit q with no truncation allowed, so earlier implementations may not be able to handle signatures with a different q size or a truncated hash. Added a MUST that the q size is a multiple of 8. I don't think any of us want to deal with hashes that don't end on a byte boundary. ================================== Section 13. (Security Considerations) says: * The DSA algorithm will work with any 160-bit hash, but it is sensitive to the quality of the hash algorithm, if the hash algorithm is broken, it can leak the secret key. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) specifies that DSA be used with SHA-1. RIPEMD-160 is considered by many cryptographers to be as strong. An implementation should take care which hash algorithms are used with DSA, as a weak hash can not only allow a signature to be forged, but could leak the secret key. change to: * The DSA algorithm will work with any hash, but is sensitive to the quality of the hash algorithm. Verifiers should be aware that even if the signer used a strong hash, an attacker could have modified the signature to use a weak one. Only signatures using acceptably strong hash algorithms should be accepted as valid. Also add: * As OpenPGP combines many different asymmetric, symmetric, and hash algorithms, each with different measures of strength, care should be taken that the weakest element of an OpenPGP message is still sufficiently strong for the purpose at hand. While consensus about the the strength of a given algorithm may evolve, at publication time, NIST Special Publication 800-57 [SP800-57] recommended the following list of equivalent strengths: Asymmetric | Hash | Symmetric key size | size | key size ------------+--------+----------- 1024 160 80 2048 224 112 3072 256 128 7680 384 192 15360 512 256 Added the key size reminder. ================================== David
- Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4 David Shaw
- Re: Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4 Ben Laurie
- Re: Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4 "Hal Finney"
- Re: Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4 Ben Laurie
- Re: Suggested changes for DSA2, take 4 Jon Callas