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Re: [openpgp] New fingerprint: which hash algo

Steve Pointer <spointer@humdai.net> Fri, 09 October 2015 15:48 UTC

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From: Steve Pointer <spointer@humdai.net>
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Date: Fri, 09 Oct 2015 16:48:19 +0100
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] New fingerprint: which hash algo
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> So if it's a new key version V5, may be it would be reasonable to go with a the new hash standard, SHA 3 (Keccak)

Surprised that nobody has mentioned Suite B:

https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml

Last updated a couple of months ago to advise:

"Use SHA-384 to protect up to TOP SECRET."

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf 

--
Steve P

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