Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP?
Ian G <iang@systemics.com> Sun, 13 December 2009 03:09 UTC
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Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2009 04:09:37 +0100
From: Ian G <iang@systemics.com>
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Subject: Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP?
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On 09/12/2009 21:17, Daniel Franke wrote: > The discussion currently going on gnupg-dev about increasing the > default iteration count for the S2K prompted me to wonder whether > OpenPGP couldn't benefit from some more modern key-derivation > algorithms. Has it ever been broken? Has anyone lost anything? It's IMO not worth changing a standard unless there is a clear and present danger. iang
- Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Daniel Franke
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Jon Callas
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Peter Gutmann
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Robert J. Hansen
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Ian G
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Ian G
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Peter Gutmann
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Jon Callas
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Daniel Franke
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Werner Koch
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Colin Percival
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Daniel Franke
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? David Shaw
- Re: Better S2K functions for OpenPGP? Daniel Franke