Re: [openpgp] Clarify status of subkeys with certification use

"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Sun, 27 May 2018 20:58 UTC

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Date: Sun, 27 May 2018 22:58:54 +0200
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: Leo Gaspard <ietf@leo.gaspard.ninja>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Clarify status of subkeys with certification use
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On Sun, 27 May 2018 19:00:04 +0200,
Leo Gaspard wrote:
> Indeed it's already possible, the issue with this solution being that
> people willing to rely on signatures by the master key now need to
> download two keys (the master key and the trusted introducer), and
> another one after any compromise, while certification subkeys are
> downloaded and updated at the same time as the master key, thus making
> for more easy-to-use WoT.

That's true.  But, I'd argue that this is more of a tooling problem:
when the tool is computing the WoT and it encounters a trusted
introducer has tsigned a key, which is not available, it should
proactively download the key.

:) Neal