Re: [openpgp] Question on WKD, Key Discovery
Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 09 May 2019 13:51 UTC
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Date: Thu, 09 May 2019 09:51:19 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: juga <juga@riseup.net>
cc: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Question on WKD, Key Discovery
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On Thu, 9 May 2019, juga wrote: > The last version of the draft [0] states: > > Only if the required sub-domain does not exist, they SHOULD > fall back to the direct method. > > Should implementations fall back to the direct method on any error > trying to fetch the key with the advanced method and not just when the > sub-domain doesn't exist?. The SHOULD there is tricky. Unless you are using DNSSEC, the question of "does a domain not exist" is very vulnerable to spoofing by an attacker. Paul