Re: Forward Secrecy
<vedaal@hush.com> Thu, 24 February 2005 19:36 UTC
Received: from above.proper.com (above.proper.com [208.184.76.39]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id OAA05558 for <openpgp-archive@lists.ietf.org>; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 14:36:19 -0500 (EST)
Received: from above.proper.com (localhost.vpnc.org [127.0.0.1]) by above.proper.com (8.12.11/8.12.9) with ESMTP id j1OJ1hkE057118; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:43 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-ietf-openpgp@mail.imc.org)
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by above.proper.com (8.12.11/8.12.9/Submit) id j1OJ1hLp057117; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Authentication-Warning: above.proper.com: majordom set sender to owner-ietf-openpgp@mail.imc.org using -f
Received: from smtp3.hushmail.com (smtp3.hushmail.com [65.39.178.135]) by above.proper.com (8.12.11/8.12.9) with ESMTP id j1OJ1c71057101 for <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:43 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from vedaal@hush.com)
Received: from smtp3.hushmail.com (localhost.hushmail.com [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.hushmail.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 92B72A32FB for <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mailserver3.hushmail.com (mailserver3.hushmail.com [65.39.178.20]) by smtp3.hushmail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for <ietf-openpgp@imc.org>; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: (from nobody@localhost) by mailserver3.hushmail.com (8.12.11/8.12.9/Submit) id j1OJ1WMn083642 for ietf-openpgp@imc.org; Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:32 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from vedaal@hush.com)
Message-Id: <200502241901.j1OJ1WMn083642@mailserver3.hushmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2005 11:01:28 -0800
To: ietf-openpgp@imc.org
Subject: Re: Forward Secrecy
From: vedaal@hush.com
Sender: owner-ietf-openpgp@mail.imc.org
Precedence: bulk
List-Archive: <http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-openpgp-request@imc.org?body=unsubscribe>
List-ID: <ietf-openpgp.imc.org>
On Thu, 24 Feb 2005 08:16:03 -0800 Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> wrote: >http://www.links.org/dnssec/draft-brown-pgp-pfs-04.html >http://www.links.org/dnssec/draft-brown-pgp-pfs-04.txt > >Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP >Comments, please! the site lists the following statement: "If expired keys are securely deleted, attackers will never be able to retrieve them to decrypt captured ciphertext. Therefore when a public encryption key expires, an OpenPGP client MUST securely wipe the corresponding private key" it would also need the suggestion/requirement that the OpenPGP client NOT be allowed to make a 'backup' of the private key, something now routinely done by default but even if it does so, and does not make any backups, it is still not foolproof, it just requires the adversary to do 'more work' assuming the sender corresponds with 'n' different recipients, and sends a new subkey packet to each of them for each encryption, if the adversary can intercept each e-mail message, and stores them, then the adversary now needs the 'n' long-term private keys of the recipients, and can then recover the subkeys and the messages so, the security still depends on the recipient's long term private keys not being compromised, as it did without the use of the subkeys but if the sender doesn't encrypt to self, and encrypts only to the receiver, how is the security improved by having different subkeys each time for that receiver? vedaal Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get secure FREE email: http://www.hushmail.com/?l=2 Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger http://www.hushmail.com/services-messenger?l=434 Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program: http://www.hushmail.com/about-affiliate?l=427
- Forward Secrecy Ben Laurie
- Re: Forward Secrecy vedaal
- Re: Forward Secrecy Jon Callas
- Re: Forward Secrecy Ian G
- Re: Forward Secrecy Ben Laurie
- Re: Forward Secrecy "Hal Finney"
- Re: Forward Secrecy Ian G
- Re: Forward Secrecy Ben Laurie